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Not Quite A Civilian, Not Quite A Soldier: How Five
Words Could Subject Civilian Contractors In Iraq And
Afghanistan To Military Jurisdiction
By Katherine Jackson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Civilian contractors serving alongside the armed services in
combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a jurisdictional
nightmare for politicians and prosecuting authorities. While there is
at least a century's worth of Supreme Court precedent sorting out
when civilians can and cannot be subject to court-martial jurisdiction,
the situation the United States now faces seems entirely
unprecedented.' Contractors today serve in capacities that make
them a hybrid as yet untested under the Constitution - the civilian-
soldier. They are not soldiers, but they are not quite civilians either.
In Iraq today contractors work as interrogators, complex systems
operators, even provide armed security for high profile politicians
and military commanders.2 Their work represents greater military
and political efficiency and efficacy in many ways.3  It also
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A. 2001,
University of California, Davis in International Relations with an emphasis in
Peace and Security.
1. Griff Witte, New Law Could Subject Civilians to Military Trial: Provision
Aimed at Contractors, but Some Fear it Will Sweep Up Other Workers, WASH.
POST, Jan. 15, 2007, at Al.
2. Peter W. Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, Embeds,
DEFENSE TECH, Jan. 3, 2007, http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003123.html.
3. Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues
Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233,
263 (Winter 2000).
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represents a development that the civilian criminal justice system has
not been well equipped to deal with.4
This problem is not new, in fact, academics, military leadership,
and other critics have long sought a solution to this paradox that
would balance the rights of the civilian with the necessity of military
authority in order to achieve criminal accountability and justice.
Recently, however, the Congress passed the Fiscal Year 2007
Military Authorization Act, a spending bill which contained a little
noticed provision altering the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), specifically, the section that describes those subject to its
jurisdiction.5 Prior to the revision, civilians were only subject to the
Code in a time of declared war;' they now fall under the Code during
a "contingency operation" as well.7  The military operations
underway in Iraq and Afghanistan qualify as contingency operations,
whereas they would not qualify as "declared wars." 8
This section of the law, which has profound implications on the
one hundred thousand civilian contractors the Pentagon estimates are
working in Iraq alone, was passed with little debate or discussion. 9
4. See Jason McLure, Abuse Case Prosecution Falls Apart: Evidence of
Alleged Rape by Iraq Contractor Elusive, 29 LEGAL TIMES 1, May 29, 2006, at 1.
5. Witte, supra note 1. Witte credits Peter Singer for breaking the news that
most of the mainstream media did not notice. Id. Singer explains this situation
accurately by saying:
The amazing thing is that the change in the legal code is so
succinct and easy to miss (one sentence in a 439-page bill,
sandwiched between a discussion on timely notice of
deployments and a section ordering that the next of kin of medal
of honor winners get flags) that it has so far gone completely
unnoticed in the few weeks since it became the law of the land.
Not only has the media not yet reported on it. Neither have
military officers or even the lobbyists paid by the military
industry to stay on top of these things.
Singer, supra note 2. He goes on to note that he is not even sure that those effected
by the change (including contractors, military prosecutors, commanding officers
etc.) are being made aware of the situation. See id.
6. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (U.S. C.A.A.F. 1970).
7. FY 2007 Military Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat.
2083, 2217 (2006).
8. See id. at § 355.
9. Singer, supra note 2.
That fact seems inconsistent with the gravity of the effect of the
provision.
Surely, there must be accountability for civilian contractors who
commit crimes abroad while contracting with the United States.
They are emissaries of our public law values while abroad and their
misbehavior cannot be tolerated if the United States is truly
committed to winning the hearts and minds of the world. 0 But
should the sweeping changes that need to be made to correct this
system be instituted through one sentence in a more than four
hundred page document, which few lawmakers, and apparently no
contractor lobbyists, even noticed?"
The prior system was broken in many ways. Incidents like the
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal highlighted the relative failure of
the U.S. civilian criminal justice system in Iraq as compared to the
military justice system. While both civilian contractors and military
service-people were implicated in the abuse, only members of the
military have been prosecuted for those crimes.' 2 Investigators and
potential prosecutors of the civilian contractors cited problems with
evidence collection, witness interviewing, and crime scene
investigation as impediments to mounting successful prosecutions.'
3
These were not obstacles for the military courts.1 4 It is easy to see
why a lawmaker would think that subjecting contractors abroad to a
demonstrably successful prosecutorial system would be an attractive
remedy. The new system that this change creates may create greater
efficiency and accountability, but at what cost?
When confronted with cases of civilians being charged and tried
by courts-martial, the Supreme Court has construed Congress' power
to create such tribunals and subject civilians to them narrowly. 15
Dispensing with the citizen's Constitutional right to a jury trial by
one's peers (among other rights) is not something the Court has been
eager to allow Congress to do despite advocates' claims of greater
10. See generally, Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized
World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383 (Summer 2006) (arguing that contracts should be
used as a tool for enforcing standards and public law values).
11. Singer, supra note 2.
12. McLure, supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 364.
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efficiency and effectiveness. 6  Without the factual scenario of a
challenge to this provision, it is difficult to know how the court might
rule.
Part II of this article explores the historical interaction between
civilian contractors and the armed services, focusing on the rise of
privatization in the military, allegations of criminal behavior by
contractors and the state of the law prior to the new change in the
U.C.M.J. Part III examines the constitutional precedent for trying
civilians in military courts. It also explains the revision to the
U.C.M.J. made law by the spending bill and the effect that this could
have on whom is subject to military law. Part IV provides a
constitutional analysis of the revision in anticipation of Supreme
Court review on a challenge by a civilian contractor. It will also
address whether there are alternative ways of addressing the problem
of prosecuting civilian contractors. Part V concludes the article.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Privatization in the Military
[T]he Iraq War is where the history books will note
that the [private military] industry took full flight. Iraq
is not just the biggest U.S. military commitment in a
generation but also the biggest marketplace in the
short history of the privatized military industry. In
Iraq, private actors play a pivotal role in great-power
warfare to an extent not seen since the advent of the
mass nation-state armies in the Napoleonic Age.17
The rise of the private military industry is attributable to the
global economy of the post-Cold War era. 18 The proliferation of
excess arms from massive military buildup made military weapons of
all shapes and sizes readily available to private purchasers. 19 As
16. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957).
17. Peter W. Singer, Warriors for Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM, Apr. 15, 2004,
http://www.brook.edu/views/articies/fellows/singer20040415.htm.
18. Mark Calaguas, Comment, Military Privatization: Efficiency or Anarchy?,
6 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMp. L. 58, 60 (Spring 2006).
19. Id.
militaries made up of large numbers of soldiers became less
necessary, many professionally trained personnel sought jobs in the
private sector. 20  These two trends, in effect, destabilized the
governmental monopoly on the ability to make war and maintain
sovereignty and presented an opportunity for companies to offer
experienced personnel and military services to the highest bidder.2 1
As ethnic animosity flared in the former U.S.S.R. and guerilla
movements in Africa raged, private companies found a niche market
in which to develop. 22 These are not the only markets, however,
where private military companies have flourished.
In the decades since the Cold War ended, the United States has
attempted to increase the efficiency, efficacy and elasticity of its
military by trimming the accumulated "bulk" from its war machine. 23
The Department of Defense aims to reduce the size of the military's
infrastructure without reducing its capacity for mobilization and
combat effectiveness. 24  Private military companies (PMCs) have
filled the gap between Cold War era forces and the modem
military.25 They provide a variety of services, including meal
preparation, housing, building, transportation, and maintenance of
vehicles, that are innocuous and necessary in today's US military.26
By using contractors in these capacities, the military is able to
maintain a "favorable teeth-to-tail ratio. 27  The military can save
money and develop its "teeth," or its combat strength, by outsourcing
its "tail," otherwise known as rear support.28 The efficiency of
employing professionals already skilled and knowledgeable in
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 62.
23. Frontline interview with Steven Schooner, Professor, George Washington
University School of Law,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/schooner.html
(posted June 21, 2005).
24. Lieutenant Junior Grade David A. Melson, JAGC, USN, Military
Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractors: A Historical Overview, 52 NAVAL L. REV.
277, 279 (2005).
25. Id.
26. Singer, supra note 17.
27. Davidson, supra note 3, at 263.
28.Id.
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maintenance of technical systems saves the government time and
money.29
More controversially, however, these companies also provide
security and operation of tactical systems that blur the lines between
civilian contractors and professional soldiers. 30  Today, civilian
contractors work for various U.S. agencies as intelligence specialists,
linguists, translators, security guards and interrogators. 31 Many even
carry weapons and have occasion to use them.
32
While the benefits to the military in terms of greater flexibility
and money saved makes the privatization of these services attractive,
it poses unique and complex problems. 33 Many observers argue that
the U.S. military is overly dependent on the services contractors
provide. 34 If that source of services should dry up or their tasks
become too dangerous, the United States loses the ability to make
war and the flexibility to deploy its armed services around the
world. 35 Arguably more important, however, is the effect that these
contractors have on the war effort in less definable ways.
Several events taking place during Operation Iraqi Freedom and
the subsequent occupation illustrate these intangible effects and
recast military contractors in a new light. The four Blackwater
U.S.A. personnel that were ambushed, tortured, and hung from a
bridge highlighted the danger civilians employed in a war zone face.
As tragic and disturbing as this incident was, perhaps more unsettling
were the allegations leveled against employees of TitanCorp in the
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. This incident demonstrated the
power individual contractors wield in terms of influencing global
perception of American foreign policy and values in times of war.
More importantly, it highlighted a lack of accountability, oversight
and administrative mechanisms for bringing civilian contractors who
accompany the military overseas to justice. To date, one civilian
29. Id. at 265.
30. Singer, supra note 17.
31. Melson, supra note 24, at 279.
32. Singer, supra note 17.
33. Id.
34. Interview with Steven Schooner, supra note 23.
35. Melson, supra note 24.
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contractor has been prosecuted for crimes committed abroad and
none have been prosecuted for crimes committed in Iraq. 36
B. The Pros and Cons of Privatization
Contractors are beneficial to the military in several ways: (1) they
can save the government money and increase the efficiency of the
fighting force in that they provide highly technical knowledge
without the government having to pay for training them and
equipping them; and (2) they provide political flexibility in offering
armed assistance to allies.37
Civilian contractors are an efficient substitute for a variety of
logistical support positions.38 Rather than spend time and money
training a new member of the armed services to maintain technically
complex equipment, the Government can contract for the same
service through a defense contractor or PMC for the same service. 39
Usually, these contractors have already been trained by the
contracting company, or acquired the knowledge from serving with
the military in their younger years.40 Conversely, however, the use of
these civilians detracts from a recruiting tool of most of the armed
services - a technical education.4 1 The tradeoff has generally been
considered worthwhile as it is cost-effective, but only time will tell
how this could affect the future of military enlistment and the
availability of these practitioners on the global market.42
The government can also achieve political flexibility by
employing civilian contractors in military capacities.43  First,
politicians can use contractors to achieve traditionally military
36. McLure, supra note 4.
37. Davidson, supra note 3, at 263-64.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 265.
42. Id. This is representative of the so-called "brain-drain" from the armed
services. Davidson hypothesizes that since contracting companies draw a lot of
their workforce from ex-soldiers (which is why they have the requisite knowledge
without needing training), in the future there will be a workforce shortage as there
will be fewer soldiers leaving the military with such knowledge. Id.
43. Davidson, supra note 3, at 263.
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objectives in places and situations where their constituencies do not
want to send U.S. troops.' Second, the relatively low visibility in
the media of contractor deaths and casualties enables the government
to use contractors in high risk situations.45
Aside from the jurisdictional nightmare that accompanies
contractors working overseas with the military, they pose significant
problems in that: (1) the risks they face seem to be mounting and
might affect their continued use; and (2) they are not subject to
command structure.46
Sometimes the involvement of civilians on the battlefield can be
disastrous and can complicate military missions. 47  The four
contractors killed, dismembered, hung from a bridge and set afire
shocked the United States public and precipitated the Marines'
bloody and costly siege on Fallujah, Iraq.48  The numerous
contractors who have been kidnapped, killed, and beheaded have
inflamed and incited both sides of the conflict.49 While these crimes
would be no less horrifying if they were soldiers, they represent a
stark and frightening prospect to would-be contractors.50 Some
military scholars worry that the United State's increasing dependence
on contractors to fulfill military jobs could be threatened by the
growing perception that such jobs are too difficult or too dangerous. 5'
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 265-67.
47. See Frontline's Private Warriors FAQ,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/faqs/ (last visited May 1,
2007) [hereinafter Private Warriors FAQ].
48. Davidson, supra note 3, at 265-67.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 265.
51. Davidson, supra note 3, at 265. A shortage in the job market would inhibit
the military from satisfying commitments overseas and seriously disable it. Id.
Also, contractors can quit while in the field if they feel that their job has become
too dangerous, unlike their military counterparts. Id. All that bars them from
abandoning their jobs are their company's contractual commitments. Id. The fact
that these contractors are not subject to military command structure compounds the
problem. Id. The new revision to the UCMJ might alleviate this potential problem,
however. Singer, supra note 2.
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Civilian contractors are also not subject to military command
structure. 52 This means that when an officer gives them an order,
they do not face the threat of punishment should they disobey it.53
This not only makes the battlefield ripe for chaos when contractors
are involved, but it also subjects both parties to harm through a lack
of coordination and cooperation. 54
Another way employing contractors can be potentially
disadvantageous is when contractors conduct themselves in a manner
contrary to American values. The allegations that have been made
against contractors serving in Iraq have been numerous and
detrimental to global perception of the United States and its citizens.
These few individuals are emissaries of American culture and values
- when their misdeeds are held up to be representative of all
Americans, the United States loses the moral authority it has
commanded for so long.
C. Allegations of Contractor Crimes in Iraq
Of all the ugly stories that emerged from the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal, the alleged rape of a teenage boy was perhaps the most
disturbing.55 A prisoner in a nearby cell reported witnessing the rape.
This witness claimed that the rape was committed by Adel Nakhla, a
civilian contract-interpreter working at the prison.56 The employee of
TitanCorp was never prosecuted, although this allegation and other
abuse charges against him were investigated.57 Prosecutors cited
problems with locating witnesses as well as problems with the lack of
statutory authority to bring charges as impediments to the
prosecution of Nakhla, as well as at least twenty other cases of
52. Davidson, supra note 3, at 265.
53. See Private Warrior FAQs, supra note 47.
54. The commingling of contractors and soldiers in prison facilities is
especially troubling. In Abu Ghraib, and more recently, at Guantanamo Bay,
soldiers have reported being given orders by civilians to subject detainees to
treatment that might be inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. A soldier is not
supposed to follow an order they know is unlawful, however, in interrogations
especially, that which is unlawful is not clearly defined.
55. McLure, supra note 4.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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alleged prisoner abuse by civilian contractors or personnel that have
been referred to the Justice Department.
58
While the military personnel involved in the abuses at Abu
Ghraib have all been prosecuted, none of the civilian contractors
implicated in the scandal have been held accountable in criminal
prosecutions. 59 In order to achieve some semblance of justice the
victims of these alleged crimes have had to resort to the civil legal
system of the United States to be made whole by monetary means.
60
Dollars seem inadequate to address the egregious abuse these Iraqis
claim to have suffered, and yet flaws in the legal system virtually
prevent any other means of achieving justice through criminal
prosecution. Recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation made
public allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, providing yet
another reason to clarify when criminal statutes apply to
contractors.
61
D. Prior State of the Law Pertaining to Contractors
The Iraq War is not the first forum in which the services of
civilian contractors have been used in conjunction with military
operations. 62 It is, however, the most illustrative example of the
inadequacy of the criminal justice system that was created to address
crimes committed by civilians in the theatre of operations. Since the
Iraq War began, not a single civilian contractor has been prosecuted
for a crime committed while working in Iraq. 63 There are two
possible explanations: either the 100,000 contractors that the
Pentagon estimates are working abroad are unique from the rest of
the population in their aversion to criminal behavior, or there is an
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Griff Witte & Renae Merle, Contractors Are Cited in Abuses at
Guantanamo: Reports Indicate Interrogation Role, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at
DI.
62. Melson, supra note 24, at 279.
63. John Sifton, United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency
Personnel Abroad: Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487,
490 (Summer 2006).
inadequate system in place to investigate and prosecute crimes
committed overseas. 64 The latter explanation seems more likely.65
Prior to the spending bill revision, there were many hurdles to the
criminal prosecution of civilian contractors, both jurisdictional and
substantive. 66 The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
represents the last time that Congress attempted to address the
contractor jurisdiction problem. The fact that only several
prosecutions have occurred under it, and none of those of contractors
in Iraq, highlights its ineffectiveness in plugging the jurisdictional
gap that contractors have long fallen through. The prosecutorial
system with which it was designed to cooperate was terribly flawed
as well.
1. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was passed
in 2000 in an attempt to subject civilians to the civilian jurisdiction of
the U.S. criminal justice system.67  It provides that people who
accompany or are employed by the armed services and who commit
crimes abroad are punished as if they had committed the crime in the
United States. 68 If the crime was punishable by more than a year in
prison in the United States, and was committed by the person while
he or she was employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces
64. Singer, supra note 17.
65. Id.
66. Sifton, supra note 63, at 491.
67. Witte, supra note 1. In United States v. Gatlin, the Second Circuit held
that the conviction of a U.S. citizen married to a service-member for sexually
abusing a minor while living on base unconstitutional on the grounds that he was
not subject to military jurisdiction. Melson, supra note 24, at 314 (interpreting
United States v. Gatlin, 216 F. 3d 207 (2d Cir. 2000). In response, many proposals
designed to address the jurisdiction problem were debated in Congress. Melson,
supra note 24, at 314. Interestingly, Senator Sessions of Alabama introduced a bill
to "legislate around" precedent that said that civilians could only be subject to
military jurisdiction in a time of war. Id. He attempted to amend the UCMJ to
apply to civilian contractors working in "contingency operations." Id. at 315. Both
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice objected to these
amendments: "Neither department supported extending court-martial jurisdiction,
believing that any attempt to extend it to civilians would be unconstitutional." Id.
68. Sifton, supra note 63, at 507.
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outside the United States, the person was subject to the criminal
justice system of the courts of the United States.69
The term "employed by the Armed Forces outside the United
States" was defined by the statute as three different classes of
employees. 70  The first encompasses those who are employed as
civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DOD) or any other
federal agency to the extent that their employment relates to the
mission of the DOD operation overseas. 71 The second are those
contractors (or subcontractors) who are employed by the DOD or any
other federal agency.72 The third, and final group, are those people
who are employees of a contractor (or subcontractor etc.) of the DOD
or any other federal agency.73 Aside from being a member of one of
these classes of employees, the person must be present or residing
outside the United States in connection with this employment.74
And, the person must not be a national or usual resident of the nation
in which they are being employed, to be subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States under MEJA.75
The term "accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United
States" is defined as a dependent of either a member of the Armed
Forces or a civilian employee of the DOD or a DOD contractor. 76
Also, the dependent must be residing with the member, employee or
contractor outside the United States and the dependent must not be a
national or resident of the country in which they are residing outside
the United States.78
This construction of the statute was problematic and, therefore, so
was the resulting prosecutorial scheme. Under the statute, there is
69. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
70. § 3267.
71. Id.
72. Id. The contractors of the federal agencies or provisional authority are
limited to the extent that the employment relates to supporting the mission of the
DOD overseas. Id.
73. Id. The employees of contractors are limited to the same extent as the
others and extend to provisional authorities also. Id.
74. Id.
75. § 3267.
76. Id.
78. Id.
27-1
some ambiguity about which employees are subject to its
jurisdiction.79 Contractors for the CIA, the State Department, or the
Department of Justice might not fall under MEJA's provisions.
80
Although it appears to cover employees, a contractor etc. of other
United States agencies and provisional authorities, the scope of their
vulnerability to prosecution is correlated to their relationship to the
mission of the Department of Defense overseas.
81
2. Investigative and Prosecutorial Authority
More challenging to bringing contractors who commit crimes to
justice was the delegation of prosecutorial authority. 82 There were no
specific regulations mandating which agency would initiate
prosecutions. 83 One of the main problems that prosecutors faced in
developing cases against contractors was with prompt investigation -
interviewing witnesses and recovering physical evidence from crime
scenes. 84 Federal regulations indicate that the Department of Defense
is responsible for initiating investigations, but the Department of
Justice is responsible for the prosecution. 85 The lack of delegation of
79. See id.; see also Melson, supra note 24, at 317 (Arguing that "if only
through trial and error, MEJA will continue to apply to a limited number of the
contractors accompanying armed forces abroad.").
80. Melson, supra note 24, at 317.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 316.
83. See id. at 317.
84. McLure, supra note 4.
85. Melson, supra note 24, at 317. Peter Singer, a leading authority on civilian
contractors and the Armed Forces and a forceful advocate for the new revision to
the UCMJ, argues:
The roles and numbers of military contractors are far greater than
in the past, but the legal system hasn't caught up. Even in
situations when US civilian law could potentially have been
applied to contractor crimes (through the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act), it wasn't. Underlying the previous laws like
MEJA was the assumption that civilian prosecutors back in the
US would be able to make determinations of what is proper and
improper behavior in conflicts, go gather evidence, carry out
depositions in the middle of war zones, and then be willing and
able to prosecute them to juries back home. The reality is that no
U.S. Attorney likes to waste limited budgets on such messy,
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this duty severely impaired prosecutors' ability to bring charges
against contractors accused of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib, and
likely more individuals.86 It would seem that the lack of coordination
between these agencies at least contributed to the failure to prosecute
any civilian for crimes committed in Iraq.
87
Another factor in this failure was that the statute only addresses
crimes that would be felonies. 88 It does not criminalize "military
offenses" and it does not address crimes like simple assault, which is
not a felony but could be associated with a charge of prisoner
mistreatment. 89 The MEJA cannot be considered a comprehensive
remedy to the problem of contractor prosecutions because there is
still unacceptable criminal behavior that goes unpunished. 90
E. Differences between UCMJ and Civilian Criminal Prosecutions
The differences between the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and civilian criminal prosecutions are reflective of the different
cultures they are designed to govern.91 "Military offenses," such as
failure to follow orders, are made punishable to achieve military
goals and promote military values - completing the mission and
complex cases 9,000 miles outside their district, even if they
were fortunate enough to have the evidence at hand. The only
time MEJA has been successfully applied was against the wife of
a soldier, who stabbed him during a domestic dispute at a US
base in Turkey. Not one contractor of the entire military industry
in Iraq has been charged with any crime over the last 3 and a half
years, let alone prosecuted or punished. Given the raw numbers
of contractors, let alone the incidents we know about, it boggles
the mind.
Singer, supra note 2.
86. See Melson, supra note 24, at 317.
87. Melson, supra note 24, at 317.
88. Id.
89. Id. Disobeying an order is an example of a charge under the UCMJ that is
not contemplated by MEJA, but should be considered as a possibility considering
the work that contractors do alongside the military. Id.
90. See id.
91. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957).
preserving the unit.92 Civilian law is oriented around the societal
value of personal freedom. 93
Objections to the expansion of military jurisdiction arise out of
Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns. 94  The Constitution grants
Congress the power to regulate the governance of the Armed Forces
and the UCMJ is the prosecutorial arm Congress has provided for
that governance. 95 The courts have held that this grant of power
creates an exception to the protections afforded citizens facing
prosecution - defendants under the UCMJ do not have a right to a
jury trial or grand jury proceedings. 96 Congress is limited in applying
this jurisdiction to members of the Armed Services and the Supreme
Court has most often found Congress' extension of this jurisdiction to
civilians unconstitutional.97
III. STATE OF THE LAW
Military authorities have the greatest interest in
governing the actions of contractors accompanying
military forces abroad. However, allowing military
authorities to try U.S. civilians conflicts with the
traditional jurisdictional separation of U.S. military
and civilian authorities. Thus, civilian contractors
exist in a jurisdictional "no man's land" between the
military and civilian justice systems that has only
recently been addressed by legislation. 98
92. Melson, supra note 24, at 317.
93. Reid, 354 U.S. at 39 (Arguing that "[i]n part this is attributable to the
inherent differences in values and attitudes that separate the military establishment
from civilian society. In the military, by necessity, emphasis must be placed on the
security and order of the group rather than on the value and integrity of the
individual.") Id.
94. Id. at 6.
95. See id. at 19.
96. See id.
97. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 364-65 (U.S. C.A.A.F. 1970).
98. Melson, supra note 24, at 277.
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A. Constitutional Precedent
9 9
The Constitution grants Congress the power to determine the
jurisdictional scope of courts-martial through its power to regulate
the governance of the "land and naval forces."' 100 Therefore, the
jurisdiction of the UCMJ must be limited to apply only to people who
are considered so closely associated with the armed services that they
fall under the term "land and naval forces" as described in the
Constitution. 10 1  This classification is referred to as the "status
99. Several portions of the Constitution are referred to continually in this
discussion. They include:
The Congress shall have Power To... make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;... To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, 18.
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish....
U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger;... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him...
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
100. 57 C.J.S. Military Justice § 14 (2007).
101. Id.
test."' 10 2 The power of Congress, thus, is circumscribed by the Bill of
Rights, allowing civilians to be prosecuted under military law only
when they fit within the definition of a member of the armed forces.
Article 2 of the UCMJ defines those people subject to its
jurisdiction and provisions.' 0 3 It is clear that Congress has the right
to amend the UCMJ as it pertains to the "land and naval Forces;" but
attempts to extend that jurisdiction to include civilians, as the new
provision does, have often failed as unconstitutional. 10 4
1. Limitations of Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Ex parte Milligan took place just after the commencement of the
Civil War.105  The petitioner was arrested, tried by military
commission and found guilty for various charges including
conspiracy against the government and disloyal practices. 10 6
Milligan, an American citizen and resident of Indiana, challenged his
conviction and imprisonment on the grounds that the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him as he was a
citizen of the United States, was not a resident of a state in rebellion
and had never served in the armed services; thus, he argued, he was
entitled to a trial by jury under the Constitution.'0 7
102. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 241 (1960).
103. Id. These parties include regular members of the armed services, military
students, reserves, retirees entitled to pay, prisoners in the custody of the armed
forces (after a sentence imposed by a court-martial), and finally persons
accompanying or employed by the military overseas in certain situations, subject to
any treaty in place between the U.S. and the country in which the armed forces are
located. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. art. 2, § 802 (2006).
104. See infra part III, sect. A, sub. 1.
105. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 107 (1866).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 108. The court considered these facts to be especially relevant:
Milligan was not a resident of a rebellious state; he was not a prisoner of war; he
was a citizen of Indiana for over twenty years; he had never served in the military
or naval service; and he was arrested by the military in his home and imprisoned.
Id. at 118. The Supreme Court stated:
No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one
which more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people; for it
is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with
crime, to be tried and punished according to law.
Id. at 118-19.
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The Supreme Court held that Milligan's constitutional rights were
infringed upon when he was denied a trial by jury.'0 8 Using strong
language, the court states that despite debate on the correct
interpretation of numerous provisions of the Constitution, one thing
was certain: "[if] language has any meaning, this right - one of the
most valuable in a free country - is preserved to every one accused of
crime who is not attached to the army, navy, or militia in actual
service. ' 1°9  The Court acknowledges that according to the
Constitution, Congress has the power to determine the manner in
which members of the military will be tried."10 Interestingly, the
Court states that "[e]very [sic]one connected with these branches of
the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has
created for their government, and while thus serving, surrenders his
right to be tried by the civil courts."'1 But, those citizens who are
not members of those services would not be subject to military
jurisdiction where the courts were open and their state was not in
rebellion. 112
The scope of Congress's power to extend military jurisdiction
was further refined in Reid v. Covert. 13 In that case, two wives of
servicemen were arrested, charged, and tried by courts-martial for
killing their husbands while residing on overseas military bases. 14
Each woman challenged her conviction and imprisonment on the
grounds that the military did not have the jurisdiction to try her, even
though she was a civilian dependent married to a serviceman and
living on a military base."15 On rehearing, the Supreme Court held
108. Id. at 122.
109. Id. at 123.
110. Id. at 123.
111. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123 (1866).
112. Id. at 121-22 (Arguing that:
[n]o usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any
offense whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected
with the military service. Congress could grant no such power;
and to the honor of our national legislature be it said, it has never
been provoked... to attempt its exercise.)
113. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1955).
114. Id. at3.
115. Id. at 4. In its first hearing and decision on this matter, the Supreme
Court decided that the convictions of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert were
constitutional. Id. at 5. The majority held that the protections of the Fifth and
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that a citizen retains the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, even
while abroad, and thus a civilian could not be subject to military
jurisdiction when charged with a capital crime in a time of peace."16
The Court first undertook the task of determining whether
anything in the Constitution authorizes the military trials of
dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas.117 Article I, §
8, cl. 14 enables Congress "[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces" but does not say anything
about dependants. 118 The majority states that prior holdings dictate
that this clause creates an exception to the normal rules pertaining to
trials: Congress can authorize trials of service-people that do not fully
comport with the Bill of Rights or Article III.119 But in examining
the natural meaning of the language of Clause 14, the Court holds
that Congress does not have the power to expand military jurisdiction
to civilians just because they accompany the military overseas.120
The Court decided that dependents living abroad with members
of the armed services did not fall under the definition of "land and
naval Forces" and therefore could not be subject to courts-martial
jurisdiction because Congress does not have the power to curtail the
rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. 12 1 Its power in limiting
Sixth Amendments (right to a jury trial and a hearing by a grand jury) did not apply
to an American citizen when tried by the United States abroad. Id. Congress could
determine the procedure in any way it saw fit as long as the trial would be
consistent with due process. Id. On rehearing the Court reversed its previous
decision and decided that the military trials were unconstitutional. Id.
116. Id. at6.
117. Id. at 19.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; Reid, 354 U.S. at 19.
119. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1955).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 20. Specifically, the Court said: "The term 'land and naval Forces'
refers to persons who are members of the armed services and not to their civilian
wives, children and other dependents." Id. at 19-20. The Court also includes a
quote from Colonel Winthrop, the "Blackstone of Military Law," that is a very
important for the purposes of civilian contractors:
Can [the power of Congress to raise, support, and govern the
military forces] be held to include the raising or constituting, and
the governing nolens volens, in a time of peace, as a part of the
army, of a class of persons who are under no contract for military
service, ... who render no military service, perform no military
duty, receive no military pay, but are and remain civilians in
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those rights (by subjecting individuals to military law) reaches only
so far as members of the armed forces. 122 Individuals must be more
connected than simply being dependants of members of the Armed
Services to be subject to the rules Congress proscribes. 123 The
majority rejects the Government's contention that the Necessary and
Proper Clause and Clause 14 allow Congress to subject civilians like
the defendants to military law. 124 It argues that this interpretation is
much too broad - that if they adopted the Government's position,
Congress would be without limitation in subjecting all persons to
military trial if "necessary and proper" in governing the land and
naval forces. 25
The Court states that military jurisdiction is supposed to be a
narrow exception to the protections and procedure proscribed and
every sense and for every capacity.. .In the opinion of the author,
such a range of control is certainly beyond the power of Congress
under [the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment] clearly
distinguishes the military from the civil class as separate
communities. It recognizes no third class which is part civil and
part military.. .and it cannot be perceived how Congress can
create such a class, without a disregard of the letter and spirit of
the organic law.
Id. at 19 (quoting Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., Reprint 1920),
106). It seems that the passage of time may have created the "third class"
Winthrop refers to as fiction, a hybrid of military and civilian, that might warrant
different treatment that simply military or purely civilian.
122. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1955).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 20-21 (arguing:
[T]he jurisdiction of military tribunals is a very limited and
extraordinary jurisdiction derived from the cryptic language in
Art. I, § 8, and at most, was intended to be only a narrow
exception to the normal and preferred method of trial in courts of
law. Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment
on the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and more important, acts as
a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of other treasured
constitutional protections. Having run up against the steadfast
bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause
cannot extend the scope of Clause 14.)
125. Id. The Court continues that in one instance, Congress legislated that
people who contracted with the military were subject to courts-martial if they
committed fraud related to those contracts. Id. In Ex parte Henderson, a circuit
court held that the law was unconstitutional. 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, No. 6,349; Reid,
354 U.S. at 20.
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mandated by the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments and Article
IM.126 While the Court acknowledges that, in fact, Congress does
have the power to "make all rules necessary and proper to govern and
regulate those persons who are serving in the 'land and naval
Forces,"' the Court holds Congress is not empowered by that clause
to expand military jurisdiction to groups of citizens not fitting within
the definition of "members of the armed services.' 27 cc
Further, in interpreting the historical development of the
Constitution, the Court holds that Congress does not have the power
to subject those who have a relationship to the maintenance of the
land and naval forces to military jurisdiction. 128  Importantly, the
majority recognizes that "there might be circumstances where a
person could be 'in' the armed services for purposes of Clause 14
even though he had not formally been inducted into the military or
did not wear a uniform."'' 2 9 They do not define precisely who is a
civilian and who is a member of the armed services.1 30
Four Justices took part in the decision of the Court and two
Justices concurred, but limited the Court's holding to civilian
dependents accused of and tried for capital crimes by a military
tribunal. 13 1 In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, the Court
extended its holding to prohibit military jurisdiction over civilian
dependents in a time of peace whether the charged offense was
capital or not. 
32
United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles addressed the issue of
whether Congress has the power to subject ex-servicemen to trial by
military tribunal. 33 At the time of his arrest, Toth was an honorably
discharged civilian and had no relationship of any kind with the
126. Reid, 354 U.S. at 21.
127. Id.. at 20.
128. Id. at 30.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Id. at 22. Because the Court had determined that wives, children and
other dependents of servicemen were not "members of the armed services," they
did not deem it necessary to clearly define instances where someone who hadn't
enlisted or did not wear a uniform would be subject to military jurisdiction despite
being a civilian. Id. at 23.
131. Id.
132. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (U.S. C.A.A.F. 1970).
133. United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 (1955).
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military. 134 He was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and
murder, offenses committed while he was a serviceman in Korea, and
taken back to Korea to be tried by court-martial. 135 The Supreme
Court held that members of the armed forces were civilians once they
had severed their relationship with the military, and thus were not
subject to military jurisdiction, even for crimes committed while they
were still in the service. 136 This decision is significant in that it
further refines who is considered a member of the Armed Services
and who is not.
Much of the "status test" is analogy; the decision in Grisham v.
Hagan is significant to determining whether contractors will be
considered outside the reach of military jurisdiction. In Grisham v.
Hagan, the Court held that civilian employees of the Armed Services
were analogous to dependents accompanying the Armed Forces
overseas and, therefore, were not subject to court-martial
jurisdiction.' 37 In this case, Grisham was a civilian employee of the
U.S. Army stationed in France and was tried by court-martial there
for premeditated murder under the UCMJ, a capital offense. 138 The
Government contended that under Article 2(11) of the UCMJ,
persons employed by and accompanying the armed forces overseas
were subject to court martial jurisdiction. 139
The court held that in capital cases, the accused civilian has a
right to a jury trial as the consequences are so dire he should be
afforded that constitutional protection, following the decision in
Reid.140  The court did acknowledge, however, that there might be
valid distinctions between civilian dependents and civilian
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 14. The Court provides an interesting description of the difference
between courts-martial and the right to a jury trial. Military personnel have unique
training and experience and that training is fit for determining crimes occurring on
the battlefield. Id. at 18. But, the basic premise underlying the jury trial is that
laymen are better than experts to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of their peers.
Id.
137. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960).
138. Id. at 279.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 280.
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employees.' 4' The gravity of the potential punishment overrode any
distinction that might have made civilian employees more amenable
to prosecution under military jurisdiction. 142
2. When Civilians Are Subject to Military Law
In Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court also acknowledged that
there are a number of decisions in the lower courts upholding the
military trials of civilians performing services for the armed forces in
the field during a time of war. 43 The Court interpreted the holdings
in these cases to be based on the Government's "war powers" - that
in times of war and in places where war is raging, military
commanders need broad power over those on the battlefield. 4 4 The
extraordinary circumstances present on the battlefield have justified
subjecting civilians to military law in those instances. 145
The Court goes on to add that although the war powers of the
Congress and the Executive are broad, they do not extend so far as to
infringe on the Constitutional rights of civilians accompanying the
armed forces overseas in areas where no hostilities are taking
place. 146  The majority holds that the military trial of civilians
accompanying the armed forces should not take place in a time or
place of peace. 147
The question then becomes "what constitutes a time of war in
which Congress has the power to subject civilians to military
jurisdiction?" United States v. Averette held that civilians
accompanying the armed forces in the field in a time of war can be
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1955).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 34.
147. Id. at 35. The Court adds, in a latter portion of its decision, that the
military's business is in training soldiers and fighting wars, not in prosecuting
civilians for criminal offenses. Id. (referencing United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)). Accordingly, military justice has been oriented
toward expediency and strict penalties in order to command obedience and
maintain discipline. Id. at 36. Consequently, the military has placed less emphasis
on the rights of the individual than civilian courts and society do. Id.
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tried by court martial; however, the Court of Military Appeals
interpreted Article 2(10) of the UCMJ to mean a declared war. 148
Although the Averette crime and decision took place during the
Vietnam Conflict, the court did not construe "time of war" to include
undeclared wars such as Vietnam. 149 In light of recent precedent on
the topic of civilians and court marital jurisdiction, the appeals court
construed the provision narrowly, warning that a broader
interpretation would make possible the military prosecution of
civilians whenever military action occurs, no matter what the
intensity. 150
The court did, however, stop short of expressing an opinion on
whether the Constitution granted Congress the power to provide for
military jurisdiction over civilians in a time of a declared war when
these civilians accompany the armed forces in the field. 151 They limit
their holding to defining Article 2(10) of the UCMJ as applying to
civilians only in a time of a war formally declared by Congress. 52 In
Reid, the Supreme Court did acknowledge that there was some
precedent to suggest that civilians could be subject to military
jurisdiction when accompanying the Armed Forces into a war
zone. 153  Even after Averette, it is still unclear what the current
Supreme Court will consider sufficient hostilities to subject civilians
to military jurisdiction.
148. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (U.S. C.A.A.F. 1970).
Although the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals do not bind the Supreme
Court, the military justice system's highest court's interpretation of when Congress
has the power to submit civilians to military jurisdiction is significant. Id. The
soundness of their reasoning and decision seems to be confirmed by the Spending
Bill provision clarifying "in a time of war." Id. The change legislates the Averette
interpretation of the UCMJ language of Section 2(a)(10) - "in times of declared
war" - but also adds the more vague term "contingency operation." FY 2007
Military Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217
(2006). The Averette holding was an interpretation of the meaning of the UCMJ
language (which Congress created) but could also represent a Constitutional
limitation on Congress's power. Id.
149. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (U.S. C.A.A.F. 1970).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Reid, 354 U.S. at 33.
B. The Change to the UCMJ
Until recently, civilian contractors accompanying the Armed
Services overseas could only be subject to military jurisdiction under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) when Congress
declared war.' 54 Last congressional term, Senator Lindsey Graham
of South Carolina inserted a sentence into a massive spending bill in
an attempt to address legal loopholes that enabled contractors to
avoid prosecution for criminal behavior abroad. 155 This revision to
Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ redefined when civilians can be subject
to court martial jurisdiction.' 56 This change, adopted with virtually
no debate or discussion, will have a profound effect on the
constitutional rights of the civilian contractors currently serving
abroad.157 Furthermore, it might fly in the face of half a century of
Supreme Court precedent. 158
Article 2(a) of the UCMJ enumerates persons who are subject to
the code or court martial system.' 59  Prior to the passage of the
spending bill, paragraph 10 read: "[i]n time of war, persons serving
with or accompanying an armed force in the field."' 160  The new
provision revised Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ to read: "in a time of
a declared war or a contingency operation" persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field are subject to the UCMJ. 16 1
154. Id.
155. Witte, supra note 1.
156. FY 2007 Military Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120
Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006).
157. Singer, supra note 2.
158. Witte, supra note 1.
159. 10 U.S.C § 802(a) (2007).
160. Id.
161. FY 2007 Military Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, at 2217. The
term "contingency operation" is defined in this law by referencing 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 101(a)(13). FY 2007 Military Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 355, 120
Stat. 2083, 2163 (2006). That statute defines "contingency operation" as a military
operation that:
(A) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in
which members of the armed forces are or may become involved
in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of
the United States or against an opposing military force; or
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Although small, this is a change worthy of note as it expands the
jurisdiction of military law and contracts the rights of civilians
serving overseas by doing away with their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to a trial by a jury of their peers and a grand jury
hearing. 162
This "clarification," as it is labeled in the bill, does not just have
constitutional implications. 163 Under the UCMJ, commanding
officers have wide latitude in determining who will be prosecuted. 164
Perhaps more importantly, military law defines behavior such as
disobeying an order, fraternization, and adultery as crimes, whereas
civilian courts do not. 165  Charges such as murder and rape do
parallel civilian courts, but in subjecting civilian contractors to
charges reserved for military personnel the Congress is making
civilians behave like soldiers which, while desirable in combat zones,
could be detrimental to the fulfillment of contractual obligations and
the personal autonomy associated with being an American citizen.
Some critics of the law believe that if interpreted too broadly or
aggressively, this law may affect embedded reporters and their First
(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of
members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a),
12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this
title, or any other provision of law during a war or during a
national emergency declared by the President or Congress.
10 U.S.C.A. § 101(a)(13)(A-B) (2006). The Spending Bill clarifies that Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom both fall under the definition of
"contingency operations" where they did not fall under the definitions of time of
"declared war." FY 2007 Military Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, at 2163.
162. Witte, supra note 1.
163. FY 2007 Military Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120
Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006).
164. Witte, supra note 1.
165. Id.
Amendment rights as well. 166 Claims that the courts or Congress
would interpret this group to be included seem unfounded. 167
Clearly, the state of the law prior to this revision was a legal
morass and critics have long been advocating that Congress address
the problem of prosecuting civilian contractors for criminal behavior
while serving alongside the military.' 68 After the allegations arising
from Abu Ghraib and now from Guantanamo Bay, Congress would
be shirking its duty if it did not act decisively and deliberately;
however, the Constitutional problems that arise from making a
sweeping change in this way are not easily surmounted, nor does the
change bring clarity to a difficult problem.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Constitutional Authority Granted Congress to Create a
System to Govern the Armed Forces Should Not Extend to
Contractors in Iraq
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to make
rules to govern and regulate the armed forces.' 69 Through this
power, Congress created the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). 170  It is within Congress' enumerated power under this
clause to create a system for the Armed Forces that does not
incorporate all the Constitutional safeguards afforded defendants in
civilian trials, which is what it did in codifying the UCMJ. 17 1
Congress's power only extends so far, however - it cannot extend
166 Singer, supra note 2. Singer asserts, however, that the journalists in Iraq
are "not armed, not contracted (so not paid directly or indirectly from public
monies) and most important, not there to serve the mission objectives" and that
therefore, any interpretation that would affect them would be too extensive an
interpretation under Constitutional precedent. Id. Furthermore, he argues, "embeds
already make a rights tradeoff when they agree to the military's reporting rules."
Id.
167. Id.
168. Witte, supra note 1.
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
170. 57 C.J.S. Military Justice § 14 (1992).
171. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19.
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such a system to incorporate civilians who cannot fairly be
considered members of the "land and naval Forces."1
72
It is clear that Congress has the power to amend the U.C.M.J. By
amending the definition of who falls under its jurisdiction, however,
Congress may have overstepped its bounds, reaching too far into the
civilian realm.
Despite the fact that the U.C.M.J. has become more robust since
the 1950s, it still does not afford criminal defendants a right to a jury
trial by their peers and a grand jury hearing. 173 It does not seem
likely that the Supreme Court will see the imposition of military
jurisdiction as less of a threat to individual rights enumerated in the
Constitution than it did almost half a century ago.
The determination of whether the provision is constitutional
depends on whether the Supreme Court determines either: 1) that
civilian contractors are members of the "land or naval Forces" under
the Constitution, or, 2) that contingency operations are so akin to war
that the infringement on individual rights is justified by the
circumstances. 174 In light of precedent, neither of these outcomes
seem likely.
172. Id. The Reid court argued:
The Constitution does not say that Congress can regulate "the
land and naval Forces and all other persons whose regulation
might have some relationship to maintenance of the land and
naval Forces." There is no indication that the Founders
contemplated setting up a rival system of military courts to
compete with civilian courts for jurisdiction over civilians who
might have some contact or relationship with the armed forces.
Courts-martial were not to have concurrent jurisdiction with
courts of law over non-military America.
Id. at 30. Similiary, in Toth the Court held "[w]e find nothing in the history or
constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with
Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with
offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or property." United
States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
173. Witte, supra note 1.
174. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 19.
1. The Status Test
Reid v. Covert made clear that Congress authority to circumscribe
certain civil rights is limited to members of the Armed Forces.
175
This principle created a "status test;" it made deciding whether a
person was fairly considered to be a member of the Armed Forces a
threshold decision. 176 If they are not considered a member, the
legislative mechanism trying to incorporate them in military
jurisdiction is unconstitutional.
The roles civilians play in providing services to the military have
changed dramatically since the Civil War. Increasingly, it seems,
these roles are becoming more soldier-like. 177 They often involve
weapons and equipment maintenance, intelligence gathering, and
sometimes involve use of force, including combat. 178  The
development of these new roles raises the possibility that contractors
could now be considered members of the Armed Forces and, thus,
subject to the jurisdiction of the UCMJ.
In order to determine whether or not the evolution of contractor
roles has affected their civilian status, the Court will have to
determine if contractors are now more like members of the Armed
Forces, or more like civilian dependants. Where either a civilian is
so connected with an armed force that a statute subjects him to
military jurisdiction, his trial by that court is not unconstitutional
because it deprives him of some of his constitutional liberties.
79
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Singer, supra note 17. Singer argues that the civilian contractor is
becoming increasingly like the soldier in fulfilling "mission critical" roles:
Private military firms carry out three crucial functions in Iraq:
military support, military training and advice, and certain tactical
military roles. It is important to note that official U.S. military
doctrine has long held that "mission critical" roles must be kept
inside the force. It has also held that civilians accompanying the
force should not be put into roles where they must carry or use
weapons, allowing the carry of sidearms (that is, pistols) only in
the most extraordinary circumstances. But what used to be the
exception is now the rule.
Id.
178. Id.
179. 57 C.J.S. Military Justice § 14 (2007).
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Traditionally, in order to be considered a member of the Armed
Forces, an individual has to have either a valid enlistment contract or
have enlisted constructively. 180  The Supreme Court has never
"delineated a bright line rule" in this determination.' 81 Rather, the
determination must be made by analogy and is not dependant on the
civilian's agreement to such jurisdiction, his knowledge that he is
subject to such jurisdiction, or on his status as an employee of either
the armed forces or the government.
182
The court first looks to the relationship between the person and
the armed services in its determination of status. While there is not a
case at hand to analyze, it is easy to imagine several scenarios. In the
first scenario, a contractor is employed to provide security for a
military commander, which necessitates the use of force often. This
person would seem to be the civilian most vulnerable to being
categorized as a member of the armed services, falling under
Congress's power to regulate. His function is one traditionally
associated with soldiers and thus might need to be regulated by
military authority. His prosecution by military authority for capital
offenses might be barred, however, by decisions such as Grisham,
which held that civilian employees charged with capital crimes
should be afforded the protections of all the applicable constitutional
amendments and therefore cannot be tried by military courts. 
183
In the second scenario, the civilian contractor works as a civil
engineer building schools for Iraqi children. He carries no weapon
and performs more of a nation building function than a combat
related role. This person would seem to be the least vulnerable to
prosecution under the UCMJ as they do not appear to be so closely
analogous to the traditional conception of members of the armed
services. They seem more like civilian dependents than soldiers.
180. 57 C.J.S. Military Justice § 16 (2007). A constructive enlistment is
deemed to have occurred when a person serving with an armed force, who is of the
mental competency and minimum age prescribed by the Code, voluntarily submits
to military authority, voluntarily performs military duties, and accepts military
benefits. Id. This provision of the Code was intended to counteract lack of
jurisdiction claims from those who might have been subject to recruiter
misconduct. Id.
181.57 C.J.S. Military Justice § 23 (2007).
182. See id.
183. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
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They live and work abroad and receive their livelihood perhaps from
working with the armed services, but they could not be fairly
categorized as members of the armed forces and therefore can't be
subject to military jurisdiction in a time of undeclared war, based on
precedent.
The third scenario is much more challenging. The contractor
works as a convoy driver, delivering ammunition to soldiers. He
wears a weapon to defend himself against ambushes, but his primary
function is transportation. Is he more closely analogous to a soldier
or to a civilian? This scenario is representative of the new contractor
hybrid - not quite a civilian, not quite a soldier. In one sense, this
contractor is most like a soldier, specifically, like a serviceman
assigned to the "tail" or logistical support services. While it might
not be the role typically associated with a soldier, especially in
today's military, it is a role that nevertheless has previously been
filled by servicemen.
There could be a compromise here - the contractor who carries a
weapon and performs a military function could be subject to the
UCMJ while others, who perform strictly civilian function, are not.
Unfortunately, things aren't always so clear in a war-zone and the
situations in Iraq and Afghanistan do not lend themselves to such
clear cut scenarios.
If the court decided that contractors are members of the armed
forces such that they can be governed by the UCMJ, that jurisdiction
can only apply to them for as long as they are serving, presumably
the length of their contract. 184 If the court should hold that civilians
cannot become members of the armed services without enlisting or
being drafted, then Congress will have a lot of work to do to achieve
the same level of accountability by creating comprehensive
substantive and jurisdictional statutes.
2. Time of War Exception
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that some court decisions
provide a basis for an assertion that civilians can be subject to
military jurisdiction during a time of war. This provision is included
in the UCMJ § 802 art. 2 and is amended in the spending bill
184. See Singer, supra note 2.
Snrin , 2007 Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier
286 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-1
revision: "[i]n a time of declared war or a contingency operation,
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field"
are subject to military jurisdiction.185
Advocates of broadening the application to the UCMJ have
interpreted Congress' constitutional authority as powerful enough to
extend military jurisdiction to civilians under such circumstances.' 86
They cite Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and the War Powers as broad enough to support this
extension. 187 The Court has decided that in times of peace, the
intrusion on civilians' constitutional rights is neither justified nor
permissible. This decision begs the question: "what about in times of
war?"
Times of war are logically the only circumstances where military
authority, and therefore jurisdiction, seems appropriate. In light of
all of the military's grave concerns about coordination and security,
compelled obedience to military command and adherence to the
mission might be justified. But in order to know when it is correct to
apply this logic, war must be defined, and not so broadly that any
armed conflict constitutes war; if the definition was so easily
satisfied, constitutional rights of civilians would be too easily
deprived unnecessarily.
In Reid, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[m]ilitary trial of
civilians 'in the field' is an extraordinary jurisdiction and it should
not be expanded at the expense of the Bill of Rights."' 88
Correlatively, the exigencies which require civilians to submit to
military authority should be narrowly limited in scope.' 89  In
conflicts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, the battlefield is not
clearly demarcated, nor do these missions qualify as wars under a
strict interpretation.
The Court of Military Appeals construed the previous
construction of the UCMJ provision ("in time of war" persons
serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field) to be
restricted to times of a war formally declared by Congress, based on
185. 10 U.S.C. § 802, art. 2(a)910).
186. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
187 Id.
188. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957).
189. Id.
their interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. 190  The Court
expressed an awareness that the conflict in Vietnam was considered a
war as the word is generally used and understood, and that all the
characteristics of the fighting - the number of casualties and troops,
the ferocity of the conflict, the extent of the suffering, and the impact
on the nation - indicated that it was a major military action. 191 They
did not, however, think that such a categorization should "serve as a
shortcut for a formal declaration of war, at least in the sensitive area
of subjecting civilians to military jurisdiction."'' 92
Critics of the Bush Administration have likened the War in Iraq
to Vietnam, sometimes too carelessly. But in this respect, the
conflicts are similar - both the Iraq and Vietnam wars were military
actions authorized by Congress, but they fall short of formal
declarations of war. The decision in Averette is not binding on the
Supreme Court; however, if the Court of Military Appeals'
interpretation of precedent and its logic are sound, it foreshadows
how the court might rule if presented with a challenge by a contractor
prosecuted by the military.
The Court in Averette was interpreting the UCMJ as it was
previously written. Congress's power to change it to incorporate
civilians under military jurisdiction must be based on either its
governance of the armed forces or on its war powers. The Averette
decision suggests that the war powers of Congress are considerably
more broad than its power to under Article I to regulate the
governance of the armed forces, but those powers do not seem to be
so broad as to place civilians under military jurisdiction when the
nation is not at war. If such a construction was adopted, any military
operation could be considered sufficient to warrant the placing of
civilians under military jurisdiction.' 93 That result is not consistent
with traditional theories of the applicability of constitutional rights.
190. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (U.S. C.A.A.F. 1970).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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B. There Are Other Ways to Interpret the Provision
Some supporters of this development believe that the change to
the UCMJ is the "21st century business version of the rights
contract."' 94 Peter Singer argues that if
a private individual wants to travel to a warzone and
do military jobs for profit, on behalf of the US
government, then that individual agrees to fall under
the same codes of law and consequence that American
soldiers, in the same zones, doing the same sorts of
jobs, have to live and work by. 195
The contractor always has the option of opting out if he or she
does not want to subject themselves to these regulations. 196
Contractors are paid nearly five- to ten-times what a soldier makes
doing the same job, and thus is given more than adequate
compensation for subjecting himself to such jurisdiction. 97 These
proponents might have some merit to their argument.
The lack of clarity on how the provision will be applied creates
confusion about whether the contract could operate as a waiver of
those constitutional rights not guaranteed under the military justice
system.' 98 If the provision only applied to contractors who contract
in the future and acknowledgement of this provision is incorporated
in the contract, this could constitute as a voluntary waiver similar to
signing an enlistment contract. Such a contract would ensure a
knowing waiver of rights prior to criminal charges and might negate
the need for a constitutional analysis of whether contractors are
members of the armed forces or are accompanying the armed forces
overseas during a time of declared war or contingency operation; it
would also make enforcement of public law values in war
enforceable.
Implementing a uniform contracting procedure such as this
would also make all contractors in the area of operations, including
those not contracted specifically to the military, subject to military
194. Singer, supra note 2.
195. Id.
196. Id. This idea ignores the possibility that contractors already fulfilling
contracts abroad might not have the same flexibility in opting out. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id.
authority and command. 199 This type of solution would relieve many
if not all of the prosecutorial problems long associated with
contractors serving abroad.200
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court presiding over Reid v. Covert cautioned:
"It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
encroachments thereon." Moreover we cannot
consider [the encroachment on civilian's
constitutional rights under military jurisdiction] a
slight one. Throughout history many transgressions
by the military have been called "slight" and have
been justified as "reasonable" in light of the
"uniqueness" of the times... We should not break faith
with this Nation's tradition of keeping military power
subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which we
believe is firmly embodied in the Constitution.20'
While it is apparent that the revision of the UCMJ brings some clarity
to a jurisdictional mess, it is not so clear that it seriously and
cautiously addresses the problem. The remedy it proposes casually
dispenses with individual rights of a class of people that did not
subject themselves to such authority by enlisting in the military. The
way in which the provision was made into law and the lack of debate
about when civilian rights should be constricted is troubling to say the
least. It seems to be a solution more concerned with expediency and
the "uniqueness" of these times, than the product of more careful
reflection on constitutional principles.
199. Singer, supra note 2.
200. See id.
201. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1957).
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